Des membres de l’AEGES organisent des panels lors de la réunion de l’International Political Science Association qui se tiendra à Istanbul en juillet 2016. Vous trouverez ci-dessous les appels à contribution.
Use of force and democratic control in a world of unequality : the case of Europe
The aim of this panel will be to raise the question of the inequality in the use of force among European countries. If European defence policies and the building of a Common Security and Defence Policy in the framework of the EU have been well documented for a few years, the question of how the European countries allow their military to use force inside and outside theirterritory and how they democratically control this use of force has been much less investigated until these days.
Thus in a period where the armed forces are not only used for military multinational operations outside the national borders but also participate internally to the fight against terrorism, the question needs to be asked : how do the Europeans nationally control the use of force ? What is the role of their parliaments ? What room if left for the civilian society ? What happens at the EU level ? Why are there so many inequalities in the democratic control of the use of force in the European countries ? The idea here is to confront the institutionalist analysis (more precisely the historical institutionalist frame of analysis) to different national cases so as to understand what explains these differences among the EU member states.
This panel will welcome both theoretical and empirical propositions of paper. The aim is to achieve either one session of 4 to 6 papers, or maximum two sessions of 4 papers each. PhD candidate are encouraged to propose papers. The work language will be English.
Abstract schould be sent to Delphine Deschaux-Dutard at delphine.deschaux-dutard(at)upmf-grenoble.fr or to Christophe Pajon at Christophe.pajon(at)intradef.defense.gouv.fr no later than October, 7th 2015.
NATO’s “rogue” members: the sources of dissent in the Atlantic Alliance
Structural theories of International Relations have long addressed the issue of alliance management. The concept of “alliance security dilemma” (Snyder, 1984) is the traditional description of the strategic choice facing members of an alliance: avoiding at the same time “entrapment” and “abandonment”. However, the disappearance of an existential threat following the end of the Cold War and NATO’s subsequent evolution into a security community (Williams and Neumann, 2000) arguably diminishes this dilemma, and thus calls for alternative analytical frameworks to make sense of the seemingly surprising behaviours of some NATO’s members. This panel explores the motivations for some states to distinguish themselves from a US-led consensus within the Atlantic Alliance, exploring several hypotheses. First, the possible persistence of the alliance security dilemma, even within a security community, must be addressed. Second, the influence of political parties’ ideological preferences towards the Atlantic Alliance can also influence a country’s behaviour (Auerswald and Saideman, 2014). Third, the quest for status within a hierarchically organized institution can be a motivation for some states to “distinguish” themselves from the mainstream in order to obtain symbolic gains (Paul, Larson and Wholforth, 2014). This panel regroups in-depth studies of states usually considered to be uneasy allies to manage within NATO, and explores the formation of their preferences and policies towards the Alliance. The comparative study offers interesting insights into why and how states choose to dissent from the mainstream policies favoured in a multinational framework. Paper proposals must be sent to Olivier Schmitt (email@example.com) by 20 September 2015.