The 2019 EISS Conference
Closed & Open Panels: General Information for Submissions
- ‘Closed’ panels focus on themes decided by the EISS (cf. the program below). Participants should send an abstract (300 words max) to the panel’s chair (cf. the chair’s email addresses and the description of the different panels below). Please make sure to send the paper abstracts directly to the panel’s chair, not to the EISS. Each panel includes four papers and the chair serves as discussant.
- ‘Open’ panels: participants propose a panel’s title, a chair, and four speakers. The chair serves as discussant. The proposals should include: (1) an abstract of the panel summarizing its academic goals and originality (300 words max); (2) the name and affiliation of the participants; (3) an abstract for each presentation (300 words max). The ‘open panels’ are meant to broaden the range of existing themes in the EISS and to provide greater latitude to the participants to contribute to the definition of the EISS program. Therefore, please consult the list of closed panels to avoid duplication. Please send the ‘open’ panel proposals to firstname.lastname@example.org.
- Selection Criteria for Closed and Open panels: (1) quality and originality of the panel/paper proposal; (2) multidisciplinarity and/or interdisciplinarity (history, political science, sociology, etc.). The panels should focus on specific themes that can be addressed from a variety of disciplines. N.B. Each panel must also include scholars from disciplines other than political science; (3) represent different European countries/regions (western, northern, eastern, central, southern Europe), as per participants’ affiliation; (4) and allow for gender diversity.
Other Key Information on the EISS 2019
- The registration rate is €30 per participant
- Travel/accommodation expenses: no funding is provided by the EISS. Applicants are advised to seek funding for travel/accommodation from their home institution.
- EISS Partner Institutions: as a general rule, by accepting to cover the travel/accommodation of its participants, each university accepts to be included in the list of EISS Partner Institutions (which entails no other cost or contribution from the home university). If a university is not able to cover the travel/accommodation expenses, the EISS also considers applications that are individually-funded or funded by third sources.
- Conference speakers will send their complete papers to the chair ahead of the conference.
- Organization of each panel: 4 presentations (10 min. each); 20 min. discussion between chair/discussant and panelists; 30 min. Q&A with audience
|2019 EISS Panels|
|9h30-11h00|| Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism
Chair: Peter Neumannµ
King’s College London
Chair: Moritz Weiss
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich
|14h00-15h30|| Private Actors, Armed Conflict and the State
Chair: Sibylle Scheipers
University of St Andrews
|16h00-17h30|| Defense Cooperation and Military Assistance
Chair: Adrian Hyde-Price
University of Gothenburg
|9h30 -11h00|| Military Interventions
Chair: Chiara Ruffa
| Arms Procurement and Transfer
Chair: Jocelyn Mawdsley
|11h30-13h|| WMD Non-Proliferation and Arms Control
Chair : Eliza Gheorghe
Chair: Claudia Hillebrand
|15h30-17h30||Concluding Keynote Panel
CLOSED PANELS: CALL FOR PAPERS
The topics of terrorism and counter-terrorism have in recent years received a huge amount of scholarly attention. The increase in scholarship can be seen in a positive light, we have gained knowledge and insight into the causes, processes and activities and termination of terrorist struggles. The scholarly output does, however, not always meet the highest scholarly standard, for which the field has rightly been criticized. The speed with which some material is published and the sometimes flimsy scientific underpinnings have been very worrisome aspects. The temptation to write treatises that summarize or integrate existing knowledge, rather than produce innovative and ground-breaking contributions, has been large. Currently, we see challenges both in regard to the consistency of the scholarly base and the content of contributions. First, how can we create a more solid and consistent base of scholarship? There is a large challenge to reduce fickleness of potential funders, who when terrorist threats rise make large funds available and when it subsides, lose interest. Second, the field is plagued by fashions. There is a consistent and hard to change lack of appreciation of (counter)-terrorism’s history. Furthermore, scholarship has devoted much time and effort in fashionable but often not very productive lines of research (e.g. the root causes discussion, radicalization and de-radicalization and WMD and terrorism). The establishment of critical terrorism studies has created a welcome theoretical diversity. However, instead of exchange, the response has generally been entrenchment. This panel is explicitly open to diverse disciplines, such as history, political science or sociology. We invite contributions for this panel which aim to discuss and debate any, or possibly all of these challenges. We hope to further solidify, from a multidisciplinary perspective, the foundations of our scholarship and work towards productive joint research.
This panel addresses the interaction between global security and its underlying technologies. On the one hand, traditional military capabilities, such as aircraft carriers, land systems or missiles, still predominate strategic thinking about this interrelationship. On the other hand, recent technological advances in diverse domains ranging from drones and robotics to cyber malware and artificial intelligence are not only transforming the use of force, but have also empowered a novel set of actors with an influential role in global security. What is ultimately at stake are the causes and consequences of military innovation. Hence this panel encourages submissions that conceptualize military technologies either as explanandum or as explanans. Preference will be given to those papers that link a systematic understanding of ‘old’ and/or ‘new’ technologies with fundamental questions in International Relations, such as cooperation and conflict, balance of power and hegemony, or continuity and change. This call is explicitly open to diverse disciplines (political science, sociology, history) and welcomes different theoretical orientations, since the panel primarily aims to encourage dialogue between scholars with a substantive interest in the interaction between politics and technologies.
In today’s political, moral, legal and strategic debates private actors in war are commonly seen as a relic from the pre-Westphalian past that has increasingly returned after the end of the Cold War. A proliferation of private actors such as mercenaries and private security companies, but also insurgents, terrorists, local militias and rebels has been identified as the main source of the state’s loss of the monopoly over the use of armed force. The panel aims to move beyond this simple juxtaposition of private actors and the state and to explore the complex links and interactions that exist between both spheres. It intends to address the following questions: Why do states choose to collaborate with and support private actors in armed conflict? How have public-private partnerships in armed conflict evolved historically, in particular between the seventeenth and the twentieth century, in other words, during a period that is seen as the heyday of the state’s monopoly over the use of armed force? How do private actors’ and states’ strategic agendas align, and what happens if they don’t? What moral and legal challenges do public-private partnerships in the realm of armed conflict hold? How do they impact on democratic accountability?
For nearly all states, various forms of defense cooperation and military assistance are central to their national security policies. This can take the form of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, or more structured and institutional cooperation through organizations such as the African Union, the EU, NATO or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In recent years, there has been a proliferation of various forms of defense cooperation or military assistance, often on a regional or sub-regional level. It can also take a variety of forms, from joint military training and exercises to operational planning, procurement and defense-industrial research. This panel invites papers on defense cooperation and military assistance in a broad and inclusive sense, from a variety of disciplines (history, political science, sociology, etc.) and of analytical, theoretical and empirical perspectives. Papers may cover responses to traditional security threats such as Russia’s military assertiveness or China’s rise, or more diffuse risks and challenges such as terrorism, proliferation, migration, human smuggling and the impact of global climate change. Papers may also cover the creation and evolution of defense institutions and cooperation arrangements whether in bi-, tri-, or ‘minilateral’ ways.
With the winding down of large scale boots-on-the-ground multinational missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has become apparent in both policy and academic circles that large-scale military interventions are but one option among others. Many other kinds of military interventions have been and are being launched and implemented, ranging from military assistance, to more ‘agile’ counterinsurgency, drone fighting, peacekeeping, and aerial interventions, among others. Recent work has investigated the politics of forming multinational coalitions for launching military interventions. Other contributions have explored the politics of implementation, looking at caveats and actual behavior of troops on the ground. A third strand has explored the implication of military interventions for the civil-military relations of the home country when those soldiers return home. Notwithstanding recent advances, within the field of security studies, there is little clarity about the conceptual, theoretical and empirical underpinnings of different kinds of military interventions with important implications for both scholarship and policy. This panel welcomes contributions on different types of military interventions and potential comparisons. Contributions are welcome from a variety of disciplines (history, political science, sociology, etc.) and may shed light on conceptual, theoretical and empirical aspects of the ongoing debate on military interventions within the security studies debate in dialogue with other neighboring fields such as peace and conflict research, operation research and military sociology.
The parameters of the global arms trade have changed in the post-Cold War era. Defense firms, especially in the West, have internationalized and some have left or reduced their exposure to the defense sector. There are also new entrants and, as Bitzinger (2010) argues, new arms producing states continue to pursue techno-nationalist policies. These changes have left some existing firms, notably in the overcrowded European market, heavily reliant on exports, which commentators increasingly find ethically problematic. This panel will seek to critically interrogate these developments and their consequences for an environment already trying to deal with disruptive technologies, events and a worsening arms control situation. For this panel, we invite papers that address any of these themes, or related issues. Contributions are welcome from all theoretical approaches and disciplines, and papers that focus on national or multilateral dimensions of arms procurement, transfers, and defense and security industries.
This panel serves as a platform for presenting and discussing research that adds theoretical depth and empirical breadth to current understandings of the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The central themes to be explored include: 1. the causes and phases of WMD proliferation; 2. nuclear strategy; 3. nuclear stability and arms control. To develop a deeper appreciation of the challenges posed by WMD, we encourage participants to answer the following questions: Under what conditions are we likely to witness a fourth proliferation wave? Which countries would be part of it? How can nuclear powers, such as the United States, China or Russia, deal with allies bent on securing their own nuclear deterrents? What changes should the nuclear powers make to their nuclear postures and force structures to enhance and strengthen deterrence? How is a new cold war between the US and Russia likely to play out in the nuclear realm? What advantages, if any, does nuclear superiority offer in the event of a crisis or outbreak of war? What are the origins and likely consequences of the turn in American and Russian nuclear strategy towards considering low-yield atomic weapons for war-fighting? How does lowering the threshold for nuclear use and the emphasis on cross-domain deterrence affect the strategic calculations of rivals in times of crisis? The panel seeks to bring together scholars and experts across disciplinary boundaries (e.g. political science, security studies, history, etc.) to discuss these topics, and so, create the space for academic cross-pollination and policy-relevant work.
Intelligence is deeply embedded within national and transnational security policies and practices. The panel’s aim is to understand the various roles intelligence plays at the strategic and tactical level. How do intelligence actors reduce uncertainty and provide a knowledge advantage? And what are the problems and pitfalls? Many intelligence practices challenge legal and ethical boundaries in democratic societies. What kind of mechanisms have been found to negotiate and implement limits of intelligence? We are particularly keen to bring together panellists from various disciplinary backgrounds and with diverse theoretical approaches and methodologies. By comparing and contrasting systems, events and practices from a range of countries, the panel aims to provide a rich picture of the current status quo of Intelligence Studies.